Little more than a breath in a windstorm

By Dick Tunison

The running back was working desperately to keep his feet pumping as he forced himself over the line of scrimmage when two big arms encircled his ankles and pulled him to the ground. A defensive lineman was the first to pile on. Then it was a safety that leaped from his position and landed next. Within a nanosecond two-thirds of the opposing team was on the writhing stack of players. A cacophony of whistle blowing did little to calm things down.

Have you ever seen such a determined display of gotchya? Well, if you’ve been following the strenuous attempts of “the generals” to take down Donald Rumsfeld these past two weeks, you have some idea of what we might dub “the military pile-on,” except that Rumsfeld is not down. During this period, six or eight generals and admirals have jumped up from the retirement seats around the rim of the stadium to criticize the coach for blunders that could put the outcome of the game in jeopardy. Never mind that they are no longer active on the team and, like some alumni, prefer to belittle rather than contribute to the voices in the cheering section.

Some of the loudest grumps complain that in previous times their sage advice was not taken by the coach. It was as if they were not heard and the value of their suggestions was lost among ideas put forth by others. The anti-Rumsfeld generals certainly have a right to their opinions, but to suggest that they were not allowed to advance contrary ideas is not borne out by the recollections of others who were in attendance at countless strategy and planning meetings in the Pentagon. General Richard Myers, immediate past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has described the meetings as “collaborative with a free-flow of information.”

The risk participants must take when they are in a collaborative environment is that their ideas will not always gain traction. Their ideas don’t always “click” with the boss. Some, like Gen Zinni, don’t support the president’s policies in the Middle East. Zinni has been opposed to Bush’s strategy for freedom from the very beginning, and he has frequently made his feelings known. Gen Wesley Clark is another who really opposes the president - so much so that he was a candidate for president in the 2004 democratic primaries. Their outcries represent political disputes as much as differences of opinion over strategic military planning.

The other aspect of today’s high-level military griping is based on the perceived need to protect one’s turf. Secretary Rumsfeld has made no bones about his views of the future of the military, and his views are often antithetical to those held by senior military officers. He has consistently advocated a smaller force with the capacity for surgical insertion rather than the use of hundreds of thousands of troops and a vast array of mechanized equipment.

These ideas have been a threat to concepts held dear by many military leaders. I subscribe to four military magazines – almost too much to read and digest - but I’m struck with the many articles that plead for the intervention of the readership. “Write your congressmen,” the authors will beg. “We must have a three-hundred ship naval force,” or a joint force fighter aircraft, or more infantry divisions. With this in mind, one can easily understand why general officers and admirals feel their interests are not being met by the Pentagon. The resulting anger brings out the voices of criticism.

Rumsfeld’s managerial style also seems to be in the mix. I had a coach once who made us run laps until we were blue in the face. We hated his guts. But he was right. We needed stamina to play well and the extra laps helped give us what we needed. Rumsfeld may be brusque and impatient with slow learners (a little like Louisiana’s Gen. Honore who advised we not get stuck on stupid) but some of corporate America’s most successful CEOs are the same way. They demand and expect excellence from their subordinates.

One wonders what our enemies think of this stink. I can’t help but believe it brings joy to their hearts and the hope that it foretells the beginning of disenchantment for the war among a small group of ex-military leaders and foes of Bush. The quickest way for us to fail in the Middle East is to get tired of the fight. Criticism that should be left to the historians is premature and gives support to the cries for us to “get out” coming from the left and the pacifists.

As long as the Secretary of Defense meets the expectations of the man who appointed him, the badmouthing of generals Zinni, Swannack, Eaton, Batiste and Clark is little more than a breath in a windstorm.